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“Head Start Works Because We Do”: 
Head Start Programs, Community Action 
Agencies, and the Struggle over Unionization 
 
Eloise Pasachoff∗ 
Introduction 
In the summer of 2002, the city of Boston watched a ªerce battle un-
fold between low-wage workers who provide child care and the social 
service agencies that employ them.1 Boston requires its city contractors 
to pay more than twice the federal minimum wage of $5.15 an hour to 
their employees, according to the terms of the city’s “living wage” ordi-
nance.2 The social service agencies, which receive government subsidies 
to run their child care programs, claimed that they could not afford to pay 
this rate. These agencies mounted an intense legal and political cam-
paign, arguing that they would be forced to lay off workers if the city did 
not exempt them from the living wage requirement, and that they would 
be compelled to cut off affordable child care for low-income working 
parents as a consequence.3 Child care workers, through advocacy groups, 
responded vigorously that the workers were no less in need of economic 
support than these low-income working parents, arguing that these are 
the very types of workers the law was intended to protect.4 
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1
 See generally Sarah Schweitzer, “Living Wage” Threatens Child Care, Boston 
Globe, July 22, 2002, at A1. 
2
 Id. (noting that the living wage, as of July 2002, was $10.54 per hour); see also Bos-
ton, Mass., Municipal Code § 24-6.2 (2002), Am. Legal Publ’g Corp., available at 
http://www.amlegal.com/boston_ma (as of Nov. 29, 2002) (establishing a minimum living 
wage of $10.25 per hour and providing a formula for annual adjustments). 
3
 See Schweitzer, supra note 1. 
4
 Id. In November 2002, the city of Boston decided to grant one-year waivers to four 
social service agencies that provide child-care services and that had demonstrated hardship 
in paying the living wage. See Sarah Schweitzer, City Gives First-Ever Wage Law Waivers, 
248 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 38 
Although this particular battle was new, the principles behind it were 
not. The conºict over the living wage waiver is reminiscent of another 
struggle that has been taking place around the country for more than a 
decade as teachers and other employees of Head Start programs initiate 
union drives and their nonproªt Community Action Agency employers 
attempt to thwart these efforts. Over the past ªfteen years, the Service 
Employees International Union (SEIU),5 the United Auto Workers (UAW),6 
the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees 
(AFSCME),7 the American Federation of Teachers (AFT),8 and other la-
bor unions9 have embarked on union organizing campaigns at Head Start 
programs in Community Action Agencies (CAAs) across the country, 
from Boston to Houston,10 Hartford to Los Angeles,11 New York City to 
Cleveland,12 Minneapolis to Michigan.13 “Head Start works because we 
do,” one union’s slogan proclaims.14 Although some CAA employers 
have accepted the union drives without much rancor, labor strife between 
Head Start teachers and their employers has been a common story. 
Both the living wage struggle and the unionization conºicts manifest 
a strange tension. The avowed mission of many social service agencies, 
including the CAAs that operate Head Start programs, is to empower in-
dividuals, families, and communities in poverty and to assist them along 
the path to economic self-sufªciency.15 The labor movement and worker 
 
                                                                                                                             
Boston Globe, Nov. 18, 2002, at B1 [hereinafter Schweitzer, First-Ever Waivers]. The 
agencies had requested three-year waivers. Id. Twelve other agencies that had similarly 
requested three-year waivers were not exempted from the Living Wage Ordinance at all. Id. 
5
 See, e.g., Jon Tevlin, Kinder, Gentler Union Busting: Companies Finding New Ways 
to Thwart Organizing Efforts, Star Trib. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Nov. 3, 1997, at D1. 
6
 See, e.g., Tom Condon, Union Drive Shows Need to Shrink an Empire, Hartford 
Courant, Apr. 15, 1999, at A3, 1999 WL 6359773. 
7
 See, e.g., Kathleen Kerr, Head Start Workers Calling for Investigation of Funds, 
Newsday (N.Y., Nassau & Suffolk ed.), Aug. 24, 1990, at 22, 1990 WL 3353482. 
8
 See, e.g., Mary Anne Perez, Azteca Director Has Her Backers, L.A. Times, Oct. 11, 
1992, City Times, at 10. 
9
 See, e.g., Julio Moran, Deep Stafªng Cuts Proposed to Save Head Start Program, 
L.A. Times (Valley ed.), Apr. 3, 1993, at B3, 1993 WL 2332076. 
10
 See, e.g., Diane E. Lewis, Antipoverty Agency ABCD Votes Against Union, Boston 
Globe, Dec. 9, 1997, at C18; Claudia Kolker, Social-Service Group Elects to Join a Un-
ion: Workers Complain of Bad Job Policies, Houston Chron., Jan. 22, 1997, at A22, 1999 
WL 6536249. 
11
 See, e.g., Condon, supra note 6; Perez, supra note 8. 
12
 See, e.g., Alexis Jetter, Head Start Staff Plans Walkout Over Pensions, Newsday 
(N.Y., City ed.), Mar. 26, 1989, at 8, 1989 WL 3367814; Sandra Livingston, A Lesson in 
Value: Head Start Teachers, Aides Seek Respect, Union Assistance, Plain Dealer (Cleve-
land), May 30, 1999, at 1E, 1999 WL 2365621. 
13
 See, e.g., Tevlin, supra note 5; FiveCAP, Inc., No. GR-7-CA-43295, 2001 NLRB 
LEXIS 903 (NLRB A.L.J. Nov. 2, 2001). 
14
 Am. Fed’n of State, County and Mun. Employees (AFSCME), Head Start Poster, 
available at http://www.afscme.org/publications/hsv/hsv00204.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 
2002) [hereinafter Head Start Poster]. 
15
 See Community Services Block Grant Act § 672, 42 U.S.C. § 9901 (2000). The pur-
pose of the Act is 
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advocates claim similar goals.16 What, then, lies behind this clash, and 
what dynamics does the conºict create? More importantly, how can the 
parties move beyond this conºict and mutually support their common 
missions? 
Answering these questions is crucial, for the issues at the heart of 
this struggle are hardly going away. As living wage movements gain 
momentum around the country,17 as social service labor unions gain 
inºuence in the labor movement,18 as the nonproªt sector increases in 
prominence,19 and as the country turns its attention to early childhood 
education and to the low-wage labor market in the wake of welfare re-
form,20 the workforce that is the subject of the Head Start unionization 
battle stands at the center of important national concerns. 
 
                                                                                                                             
to provide assistance to States and local communities, working through a network 
of community action agencies and other neighborhood-based organizations, for 
the reduction of poverty, the revitalization of low-income communities, and the 
empowerment of low-income families and individuals in rural and urban areas to 
become fully self-sufªcient . . . [to obtain] the maximum participation of resi-
dents of the low-income communities and members of the groups served by pro-
grams assisted through the block grants made under this chapter to empower such 
residents and members to respond to the unique problems and needs within their 
communities . . . [including a variety of groups such as] individual citizens, and 
business, labor, and professional groups, who are able to inºuence the quantity 
and quality of opportunities and services for the poor. 
Id.; see also Head Start Act § 636, 42 U.S.C. § 9831 (2000) (stating that the objective of 
the Act is “to promote school readiness by enhancing the social and cognitive development 
of low-income children through the provision, to low-income children and their families, 
of health, educational, nutritional, social, and other services that are determined, based on 
family needs assessments, to be necessary”). 
16
 See, e.g., Am. Fed’n of Labor-Cong. of Indus. Orgs. (AFL-CIO), What We Stand 
For: Mission and Goals of the AFL-CIO, available at http://www.aº-cio.org (last visited 
Nov. 29, 2002). The AFL-CIO states that its mission is 
to improve the lives of working families . . . . We will make the voices of working 
families heard across our nation and in our neighborhoods. We will create vibrant 
community labor councils that reach out to workers at the local level. We will 
strengthen the ties of labor to our allies. We will speak out in effective and crea-
tive ways on behalf of all working Americans. 
Id. 
17
 See, e.g., Ass’n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now (ACORN), Living Wage Resource 
Center, available at http://www.livingwagecampaign.org (last visited Nov. 29, 2002) (de-
scribing ªfteen living wage campaigns spearheaded by ACORN over the last six years). 
18
 The increased prominence of social service unions is due at least in part to the de-
cline of domestic manufacturing. See, e.g., Katherine S. Newman, No Shame in My 
Game: The Working Poor in the Inner City 44, 153–54, 274–75 (1999); Rebecca M. 
Blank, It Takes a Nation: A New Agenda for Fighting Poverty 67 (1997); William 
Julius Wilson, When Work Disappears: The World of the New Urban Poor 28–31 
(1996). 
19
 See generally Peter Dobkin Hall, Inventing the Nonproªt Sector and 
Other Essays on Philanthropy, Volunteerism, and Nonproªt Organizations (1992). 
20
 See, e.g., Work and Family Act of 2002, S. 2524, 107th Cong. (2002); Self-
Sufªciency Act, H.R. 3667, 107th Cong. (2002); A Living Wage, Jobs for All Act, H.R. 
250 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 38 
This Note outlines initial answers to the questions above. After 
brieºy describing the history and mission of CAAs and the Head Start 
program, and their intersection with the labor movement, Part I analyzes 
the practical, rhetorical, and legal arenas in which the battle over Head 
Start unionization is waged. Part II proposes strategies for change, offer-
ing legislative solutions, regulatory proposals, and preemptive problem-
solving and dispute resolution possibilities. My central thesis is that the 
labor movement and the CAAs that operate Head Start programs have 
many common interests and overlapping missions, and that the two sides 
in this conºict can and should move beyond competition to cooperation. 
The struggle over unionization is not simply about the distribution of an 
inadequate pot of money, so it is not a zero-sum game; beneath the 
speciªc points of contention lie opportunities for the parties to work to-
gether amicably to achieve better results. I focus on unions in Head Start 
programs, rather than on the living wage, because the union struggle has 
a much longer history, but I hope that lessons from the union struggle 
will inform the emerging living wage debate. In fact, the battle over the 
living wage may actually comprise the latest stage in the Head Start un-
ionization conºict, since unions themselves have organized and sup-
ported several living wage campaigns in recent years.21 Understanding 
the history of this conºict is essential to changing its future. 
I. The Contours of the Conºict 
Community Action Agencies and Head Start both came into exis-
tence as part of President Johnson’s War on Poverty.22 In 1964, the Eco-
nomic Opportunity Act23 created a national network of local community 
agencies (CAAs) designed to combat poverty by organizing and employ-
ing low-income adults. Today, more than 1100 CAAs serve more than ten 
 
                                                                                                                             
3682, 107th Cong. (2002).  
21
 See, e.g., Janice Fine, Moving Innovation from the Margins to the Center, in A New 
Labor Movement for the New Century 119, 129–33 (Gregory Mantsios ed., 1998) 
[collection hereinafter New Labor Movement] (framing the Baltimore living wage cam-
paign as “a key component of community unionism”); Steven Lerner, Taking the Offensive, 
Turning the Tide, in New Labor Movement, supra, at 69, 80 (noting the importance of 
living wage campaigns in union strategies); John J. Sweeney, America Needs a Raise: 
Fighting for Economic Security and Social Justice 118 (1996) (describing nation-
wide living wage campaigns organized by “labor unions and their allies” in localities in-
cluding Baltimore, Milwaukee, Santa Clara County, Denver, New York City, New Orleans, 
Chicago, and Los Angeles). 
22
 See generally Nat’l Ass’n for State Cmty. Servs. Programs (NASCSP), Com-
munity Services Network: The Community Services Block Grant in Action, Fis-
cal Year 2000 (2001), available at http://www.ezlistings.com/MemberFiles/L2084/Text4. 
pdf [hereinafter NASCSP]; Edward Zigler & Susan Muenchow, Head Start: The 
Inside Story of America’s Most Successful Educational Experiment (1992). 
23
 See Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, § 202, 78 Stat. 508, 
516; NASCSP, supra note 22, at 8.  
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million low-income people across the nation, in urban as well as rural 
areas, through a variety of anti-poverty programs.24 In 1965, the ªrst 
Head Start programs opened their doors around the country to provide 
comprehensive services—including health care, social services, and early 
education—to poor children of preschool age. Head Start programs them-
selves reached almost one million children through approximately 1500 
grantees in the past ªscal year.25 Although many Head Start programs are 
operated by service providers other than CAAs, the national Community 
Action network is the biggest single provider of Head Start, and Head 
Start is among the largest programs that CAAs run.26 
At the federal level, control of and support for CAAs comes from 
the Ofªce of Community Services, which is housed within the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services’ Administration for Children and 
Families (ACF).27 ACF also contains the federal agency for Head Start 
programs, the Head Start Bureau.28 Federal funds for CAAs are provided 
in block grants to the states, which then allocate the money to local 
CAAs.29 In 2000, each dollar of federal money administered to CAAs 
leveraged an additional ªve dollars from state, local, and private funds.30 
In contrast, Head Start funds pass directly from ACF to the local grant-
ees,31 which must contribute twenty percent of their total Head Start 
budget; federal funds make up the other eighty percent.32 
Head Start has never limited its scope exclusively to meeting the 
needs of children. Rather, since its inception, Head Start has provided 
unemployed parents with training and job opportunities, often as Head 
 
                                                                                                                             
24
 See NASCSP, supra note 22, at 6. CAAs not only run Head Start programs, but also 
provide job training, educate individuals on income management, help make houses and 
apartments more energy efªcient, partner with health clinics, and identify and create solu-
tions for speciªc community problems where no clear program already exists. See id. at 
17–19. 
25
 Head Start Bureau, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 2002 Head Start 
Fact Sheet, available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/hsb/research/factsheets.htm 
(last modiªed Oct. 2, 2002). 
26
 See NASCSP, supra note 22, at 9. 
27
 See generally Admin. for Children & Families, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., ACF Home Page, at http://www.acf.hhs.gov (last modiªed Nov. 26, 2002). 
28
 See generally Head Start Bureau, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., HSB Home 
Page, at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/hsb (last visited Nov. 29, 2002). 
29
 See NASCSP, supra note 22, at 10. 
30
 Id. at 11. 
31
 For controversies surrounding attempts in 1974 and 1981 to make Head Start a block 
grant, see Zigler & Muenchow, supra note 22, at 176–77, 194–98. 
32
 See Valora Washington & Ura Jean Oyemade Bailey, Project Head Start: 
Models and Strategies for the Twenty-First Century 30–31 (1994). 
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Start employees.33 CAAs also have been actively involved in moving in-
dividuals and families off public assistance and into well-paying jobs.34 
At a fundamental level, then, CAAs that administer Head Start pro-
grams appear to be natural allies of the labor movement, which has 
claimed the mantle of ªghting for American workers for more than a cen-
tury. One scholar articulates the mission of the labor movement from 
1955 to 1995—the same period that witnessed the rise of CAAs and 
Head Start programs—as “insur[ing] fair wages, increas[ing] job secu-
rity, protect[ing] against victimization, improv[ing] the conditions of 
work, and provid[ing] additional beneªts.”35 It is difªcult to believe that 
managers of CAAs and Head Start programs would not embrace this 
mission for their clients, many of whom are low-wage workers. Indeed, 
the labor movement’s current mission ªts even more clearly into the 
grassroots, community-empowering goals of CAAs and Head Start. The 
new unionism “encourages a shift away from the narrow institutional 
interests of unions and toward a focus on building coalitions and a broad 
social movement,” supports not only current union members but also 
low-income workers in every sector, pays more attention to women and 
minorities than ever before, and places greater emphasis on “grassroots 
efforts and direct action.”36 
Despite similarities in the goals of labor organizers and CAA-
operated Head Start programs, the two movements remained largely un-
connected for several decades; not until the mid-1980s did their interac-
tions make national news. Sadly, it was labor strife, not a new collabora-
tive effort, that drew them together. Teachers at a Head Start program on 
Long Island, New York, unionized in 1987 and ultimately went on strike 
after months of unsuccessful contract negotiations, thereby shutting 
down the program temporarily.37 The issues that emerged in this 
conºict—the disputes over wages, the war of words, and the legal ma-
neuvering—have resurfaced around the country time and again over the 
past ªfteen years, with little variation.38 
 
                                                                                                                             
33
 See, e.g., Zigler & Muenchow, supra note 22, at 227 (“Head Start from its outset 
was designed as a two-generational program, promoting social competence for children 
and economic self-sufªciency for parents. At its best, Head Start has incorporated both a 
jobs and a services strategy in attacking poverty.”). 
34
 See NASCSP, supra note 22, at 18. 
35
 Gregory Mantsios, What Does Labor Stand For?, in New Labor Movement, supra 
note 21, at 44, 46. 
36
 Id. at 50–51. 
37
 See, e.g., Adam Z. Horvath, Head-Start Strike: 200 in Suffolk to Picket; Centers Vow 
to Open, Newsday (N.Y., Nassau & Suffolk ed.), Apr. 11, 1988, at 2, 1988 WL 2944996. 
There were earlier attempts to unionize Head Start programs elsewhere, but none received 
as much press coverage as this story. See, e.g., Econ. Opportunity Planning Ass’n of 
Greater Toledo, Inc., No. 83-127, DAB No. 591 (Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. Appeals 
Bd. Nov. 6, 1984), 1984 WL 250057 (citing a claim that the Head Start director’s alleged 
“inept leadership” led to employees’ attempt to unionize in 1980).  
38
 See, e.g., supra notes 5–12 and discussion infra Part I.A–C. 
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These battles over unionization in CAA-operated Head Start pro-
grams take place on three levels. In the practical arena, the CAA direc-
tors and Head Start employees argue over speciªc bread-and-butter is-
sues. In the rhetorical arena, both sides wage heated media campaigns in 
an attempt to gather public support. Finally, in the legal arena, each side 
argues its case to a court or to the National Labor Relations Board. It is 
important to understand these arenas of dispute, not because the issues 
are new—the arguments and strategies resonate with labor struggles in 
other sectors—but rather because the familiar issues take on new mean-
ings in this context of anti-poverty social service agencies. Labor 
conºicts in CAAs and Head Start programs arose quickly and spread rap-
idly, and there has been little systematic effort to understand the central 
issues driving the sides apart. It is necessary to understand the dynamics 
of this conºict in order to ªnd national solutions for what has turned out 
to be a national problem. 
A. Practical Issues 
One central issue in many Head Start union campaigns is the level of 
compensation in salary and beneªts earned by Head Start workers. In 
most union drives there has been no city-wide living wage ordinance to 
contend with, so union organizers have pointed to another external index 
of fairness: the salaries paid to preschool and kindergarten teachers in the 
public school system. In a 1999 union drive in Cleveland, organizers con-
trasted a Head Start teacher who made less than $21,000 teaching pre-
schoolers with a kindergarten teacher who could make $35,000.39 Union 
drives and contract battles have also focused on pensions, a beneªt gen-
erally received by public school teachers but rarely obtained by Head 
Start employees. In 1989, for example, 1500 Head Start employees serv-
ing 11,000 children in New York City threatened to walk out over the 
issue of pensions, which no Head Start employee in the city had at that 
time.40 The threat alone was successful, and employees won retroactive 
pensions commensurate with their years of service to the program with-
out actually striking.41 
The issue of disparate compensation between Head Start instructors 
and teachers in the public school system has also been widely discussed 
outside the union context. In 1990, the National Head Start Association 
released a report ªnding that almost half of all Head Start teachers 
earned less than $10,000 a year.42 Even a Head Start teacher with a col-
lege degree would start at just under $12,000—thirty-seven percent less 
 
                                                                                                                             
39
 Livingston, supra note 12. 
40
 See Jetter, supra note 12. 
41
 See Kevin Flynn, City Settles with Head Start, Newsday (N.Y., City Ed.), Mar. 31, 
1989, at 30, 1989 WL 3348971. 
42
 See Washington & Bailey, supra note 32, at 120–21. 
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than a public school teacher in a comparable position would make.43 In a 
recent decision in the decades-long Abbott v. Burke litigation over facili-
ties funding in New Jersey public schools, the court expressed concern 
that Head Start was facing a “brain drain” as qualiªed teachers left for 
the public school system, and emphasized that “[d]istricts must address 
salary parity.”44 Directors of Head Start programs—“management” in the 
Head Start union wars—also publicly acknowledge the difªculties they 
face in attracting and retaining qualiªed staff, given better salaries and 
beneªts in the public schools.45 
When faced with union demands for better salaries and beneªts, 
however, some directors of Head Start programs have refused to negoti-
ate, explaining that their hands are ªnancially tied.46 They note that 
CAAs have a limited amount of money to spend.47 As one CAA director 
said to the Boston Globe last summer regarding the living wage, “We 
would be happy to pay it if someone would give us the money.”48 Alterna-
tively, CAA directors may pit Head Start teachers against other worthy 
recipients of public funds. For instance, the City of New York eventually 
did offer pensions to its Head Start employees, but it said it would have 
to cut other programs in order to do so.49 
Yet solutions to these disputes over disparate compensation do exist. 
Some Head Start directors have found creative ways to provide increased 
compensation for their teachers. In the mid-1980s, a Head Start program 
director in Cambridge, Massachusetts, designed a retirement plan for her 
staff members with a three percent contribution by Head Start, ªnding it 
unacceptable that the Head Start instructors would otherwise be without 
retirement beneªts even after spending decades with the program.50 In 
1986, Head Start teachers in Broward County, Florida, shifted to the 
same compensation scale used in the local public schools.51 Thus, at least 
in some circumstances, it is possible to expand the size of the pie and 
provide compensation levels that beneªt both instructors and Head Start 
programs. Why, then, do negotiations over compensation so frequently 
 
                                                                                                                             
43
 Id. 
44
 Abbott v. Burke, 790 A.2d 842, 853 (N.J. 2002). 
45
 See, e.g., Head Start Reauthorization: Hearing on H.R. 4151 Before the Subcomm. 
on Children, Family, Drugs, and Alcoholism of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human 
Res., 101st Cong. 39–41 (1990) (statement of Sister Barbara McMichael, Director, Provi-
dence Head Start, Providence, R.I.); The Future of Head Start: Hearing on H.R. 4151 Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Educ. and Health of the Joint Econ. Comm., 101st Cong. 63–64 
(1990) (statement of Sandra Waddell, Director, North Shore Community Action Programs, 
Inc., Beverly, Mass.). 
46
 See Condon, supra note 6. 
47
 See id. 
48
 Schweitzer, supra note 1. 
49
 See George James, Preschool Staff Demand Pensions: Head Start Workers, Saying 
Negotiations are Stymied, Take to the Picket Lines, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1988, § 1, at 65. 
50
 See Zigler & Muenchow, supra note 22, at 214. 
51
 See id. at 216. 
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descend into either/or ªghts between these teachers (through their un-
ions) and the directors? 
One way to explain this phenomenon is that union drives usually oc-
cur after trust and respect between labor and management have dissi-
pated. In such a hostile environment, collaboration to solve problems is 
more difªcult to achieve.52 A common refrain in union drives in all eco-
nomic sectors is that management does not respect employees.53 This 
complaint is particularly jarring in anti-poverty agencies, many of whose 
employees are former clients. Still, the complaints come. When manage-
ment refuses to meet with employee negotiating teams,54 or when Head 
Start instructors are asked to perform menial tasks that make them feel 
like babysitters rather than professionals,55 employees argue that they are 
not being valued or appreciated. 
On the other side, CAA directors who otherwise might sympathize 
with the labor movement may feel attacked and misunderstood, and con-
sequently may refuse to negotiate or collaborate, when union leaders 
(particularly those from outside the social service sector and the educa-
tional community) waltz into their agency ofªces and demand to meet 
with them,56 or, alternatively, seemingly engage in delaying tactics in ne-
gotiations.57 CAA directors can become especially frustrated by, and 
dismissive of, outside union organizers who fail to acknowledge the con-
straints imposed on Head Start programs by federal regulations.58 
Lawyers for CAAs and Head Start programs emphasize the impor-
tance of mutual trust and respect in creating workplace environments 
where employees will not want to unionize. One lawyer in Minneapolis 
attempts to convey this fundamental point in his “union avoidance” 
workshops: “[C]ompanies have unions because they deserve them.”59 He 
 
                                                                                                                             
52
 See William N. Cooke, Labor-Management Cooperation: New Partnerships 
or Ongoing Circles? 121–25 (1990) (analyzing the role of distrust in inhibiting labor-
management cooperation). But see Charles T. Kerchner & Julia E. Koppich, Rethinking 
Labor-Management Relations; It’s a Matter of Trust, Or Is It?, at http://63.197.216.234/ 
crcl/mindworkers/udpages/rethinking.htm (2000) (describing innovation and creativity in 
teacher-school district negotiations as more important for achieving educational results 
than developing trust for trust’s sake). 
53
 See, e.g., Toni Gilpin et al., On Strike for Respect: The Clerical and Tech-
nical Workers’ Strike at Yale University, 1984–85, at 9 (1995); see also Sweeney, 
supra note 21, at 124 (“The most important thing we can do is to assist working men and 
women who are organizing for raises, rights, and respect.”). 
54
 See Molly Kavanaugh, New Head of Agency Cancels Talks with Union, Plain 
Dealer (Cleveland), Oct. 13, 1999, at 1B, 1999 WL 2386876.  
55
 See Livingston, supra note 12.  
56
 See Telephone Interview with Donna M. Hogle, Coordinator, Indiana Head Start-
State Collaboration Ofªce (Oct. 17, 2002). 
57
 See Kavanaugh, supra note 54 (reporting a CAA director’s interpretation of the un-
ion representatives’ delay in meeting at a scheduled time as “a sign of disrespect”). 
58
 See Telephone Interview with Donna M. Hogle, supra note 56. 
59
 Tevlin, supra note 5. 
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explains that “proper human relations” are one way to avoid a union 
drive, and that the “best way to keep a union out is by creating trust.”60 
Employees and directors of Head Start programs would seem to 
agree that trust and respect are critical factors in the manager-employee 
relationship. The question is how to ensure that this point of agreement 
actually gets implemented in a meaningful way, rather than as deceptive 
language masking either an illegal anti-union campaign or a union drive 
focused on unionization at any cost and above all else. 
B. Rhetorical Arguments 
As the preceding discussion suggests, important substantive issues 
underlie union-management conºicts in Head Start programs. How 
should the salary and beneªt scales be set? How can structures for im-
proved employee-management communication be designed? Yet these 
arguments over practical issues often slip into rhetorical battles where 
each side insists that its own demands are indispensable and engages in 
accusatory fault-ªnding and self-absolution. 
The ªrst set of rhetorical arguments commonly used in Head Start 
union debates involves competing visions of race and gender. From the 
unions’ perspective, CAAs are trampling on the rights of the poor, minor-
ity women who work there. Article after article about the Head Start un-
ion movement repeats this demographic theme, emphasizing that some 
Head Start employees earn so little that they meet the income qualiªca-
tions to obtain food stamps and to enroll their own children in Head Start 
programs.61 These employees deserve better, say the unions, but CAAs 
are taking advantage of them.62 
From the perspective of some CAAs, however, unions are dominated 
by white outsiders who want to exert control over social service agencies 
with large minority constituencies and leadership. Robert M. Coard, 
president and chief executive of Action for Boston Community Develop-
ment (ABCD), voiced this perspective after ABCD employees voted 
against union representation by the SEIU: “There were . . . no minorities 
in the delegation of organizers. I think people looked at that and said, 
‘Who are they representing?’”63 Alyce Dillon, executive director of the 
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Minneapolis-based Parents In Community Action (PICA), was more di-
rect in her criticism: “White folks in charge, that’s what [the union lead-
ers’] agenda is . . . White folks in charge, second-class treatment for eve-
ryone else.”64 Dillon went on to accuse the National Labor Relations 
Board, unions, and the national educational establishment of conspiring 
with each other: “This is about trying to teach poor and minority people a 
lesson. If you’re not under control, we’ll get you. That’s what this is 
about.”65 
The unions and the CAAs thus make exactly the same argument 
about the exploitation of women and minorities, simply trading accusa-
tions of wrongdoing. But the arguments on each side lack nuance. It is 
easy to note in an aside, as did the article that reported Alyce Dillon’s 
anti-union tirade, that Dillon is white and makes $85,000 a year, while 
most Head Start employees make less than $20,000; the article implicitly 
suggested that Dillon herself is ignorant of the ªnancial difªculties that 
her low-income employees face.66 Yet this image of the Head Start direc-
tor is incomplete, for Dillon once was a single mother on welfare, living 
in public housing, separated from a drug-addicted husband, with two 
children in Head Start.67 Likewise, although even a cursory review of the 
labor movement’s history will reveal numerous instances where women 
and minorities were excluded from union representation and leadership, 
suggestions that unions cannot fully involve women and minorities ig-
nore serious efforts and successes in doing so.68 In fact, the arguments of 
both sides are complementary, not competing—CAAs can be helping 
poor individuals and taking advantage of a low-wage labor market at the 
same time. This rhetorical debate about race and gender does little to ad-
vance solutions. 
A second rhetorical argument focuses on the welfare of children in 
Head Start programs. Each side portrays itself as the champion of this 
vulnerable population, and either explicitly or implicitly accuses the 
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other side of selªshly prioritizing its own needs. For instance, CAAs may 
suggest that teachers who are truly committed to the well-being of chil-
dren do not need much in the way of ªnancial remuneration. Thus Irene 
Tovar, executive director of the Latin American Civic Association in the 
Los Angeles area, praised her agency’s reorganization strategy, which 
included union-opposed layoffs.69 She explained how much the CAA 
cared for children: “We wanted to show that we had the kids’ interest at 
heart, ªrst and foremost. The agency has been able to show that once we 
took out all the hurt feelings and misunderstandings, that our real com-
mitment has been to the kids.”70 
On the ºip side, a union ofªcial in New York City made a similar 
point with regard to employees of city-run day care and Head Start pro-
grams whose pay had been delayed for six weeks. Raglan George ex-
plained that the employees had “worked without pay because of concern 
for the children,” and critiqued then-mayor Rudolph Giuliani for “crip-
pling the children.”71 As one editorial wryly observed: “Dedicated teach-
ers, so the stereotype goes, ªnd a satisfaction in working with children 
that compensates for their low wages. But dedication alone does not put 
groceries on the table or pay the rent. Dedication does not make up for a 
lack of health coverage and retirement beneªts.”72 
This rhetorical battle is difªcult to win. Both sides undoubtedly are 
concerned that speciªc proposals might help or harm the children whom 
it is their common mission to serve, but their competing claims ulti-
mately do the children little good. A newspaper article written at the 
early stages of the Head Start union movement framed the problem of 
these competing perspectives bluntly: “Both sides said they had the inter-
ests of the program’s children at heart. But some parents found it difªcult 
to trust either [side].”73 By engaging in verbal warfare rather than ad-
dressing the concrete problems that actually affect the lives of low-
income children, Head Start teachers and CAA directors alike can alien-
ate parents and damage relationships with children and families. 
In a third rhetorical argument, unions and Community Action Agen-
cies battle over the “true nature” of the CAA. On the one hand, unions 
portray CAAs as having abandoned their grass-roots origins to become 
big business, multi-million-dollar agencies that squeeze everything they 
can out of their employees. One article describing a union drive in Hart-
ford’s largest CAA, the Community Renewal Team (CRT), reºects this 
perspective: 
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CRT was incorporated 35 years ago as an anti-poverty agency. 
Its founders hoped it would do its job and be out of business by 
1970. It didn’t go out of business, it is business. CRT now has 
600 employees, 450 of whom are full time, and an annual 
budget last year of about $48 million. The executive director, 
Paul C. Puzzo, makes almost $140,000 a year . . . . CRT is now 
what used to be called “the establishment.74 
On the other hand, CAAs assert that they are local organizations run by 
local folks, and that the millions of dollars they manage are federal funds 
that go directly to empower the local poor.75 
Outside the context of a unionization battle, in a less heated mo-
ment, one former Head Start director offers a perspective that combines 
both views. The world of Head Start is changing, says Donna Hogle, the 
former director of a Head Start program and the current Head Start Col-
laboration Project Coordinator for the state of Indiana.76 Given the size of 
the programs’ budgets—which often run into the millions77—and the 
need to partner and negotiate with so many different groups, the success-
ful operation of Head Start programs now requires greater business skills 
than were needed twenty years ago.78 Although she describes the CAAs 
that operate Head Start programs as big business, she recognizes their 
community roots and the number of parent-employees in Head Start pro-
grams, and she suggests that both sides must work together more amica-
bly to direct the limited federal dollars to their intended community re-
cipients.79 As with the rhetorical arguments over race and gender and over 
the best interests of children, then, arguments over the “true nature” of 
Community Action Agencies have truth on both sides. 
Since each side usually offers the mirror image of the other’s asser-
tions, it is difªcult to make an independent assessment of the rhetorical 
arguments employed in the Head Start union struggle. Empirical data 
could help resolve some of these arguments. For example, since each side 
claims to be the true champion of the least powerful, a statistical com-
parison of the racial and gender demographics of union leaders and CAA 
directors might prove useful. However, empirical evidence can be ma-
nipulated easily to continue the war of words.80 In the end, the rhetorical 
battles needlessly simplify and obscure the complex reality to which both 
sides must pay attention in order to achieve their common goals. 
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C. Legal Challenges 
Head Start workers and their Community Action Agency employers 
wage two primary legal battles in the war over unionization. The ªrst 
battle is over whether federal or state labor law will govern the dispute. 
The second battle emerges as each side trades accusations of unfair labor 
practices. 
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) is the federal law that 
governs labor relations in the private sector.81 It guarantees workers the 
right to bargain collectively with their employers over the terms of their 
employment82 and protects them against employer reprisals for engaging 
in union activity.83 It imposes obligations on both employers and unions 
to bargain in good faith without engaging in unfair labor practices, which 
it extensively deªnes.84 The NLRA established the National Labor Rela-
tions Board (NLRB) to enforce the NLRA.85 The NLRB includes the ªve-
member Board that issues ªnal administrative decisions, a general coun-
sel that supervises regional and ªeld ofªces, and those regional and ªeld 
ofªces.86 At the request of either the union or the employer, regional 
ofªces administer union elections and determine whether unions or em-
ployers have engaged in an unfair labor practice.87 Regional administra-
tive law judges hold initial hearings and issue initial decisions, which 
may be appealed up to the ªve-member Board in Washington, D.C.88 Fi-
nal decisions issued by the Board may be appealed directly to a U.S. 
Court of Appeals.89 
The NLRA exempts government employers and any “political subdi-
vision” from its coverage,90 leaving such employers to be governed by 
state labor laws.91 The ªrst legal question in the Head Start unionization 
context is whether the Community Action Agency employer falls within 
this exemption. Put another way, the argument centers around whether 
the NLRB has jurisdiction over the employer. In general, CAAs have ar-
gued that they are exempt “political subdivisions,” while employees of 
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Head Start programs and CAAs have argued that the NLRA applies.92 
Employees have tended to seek redress under the NLRB for its perceived 
greater protection for employees than state labor laws, while employers 
have generally opposed NLRB jurisdiction for the same reason.93 Em-
ployees have recently begun to win this dispute over jurisdiction. Two 
separate strands of NLRB decisions over the last decade have expanded 
the ability of the NLRB to assert jurisdiction over CAAs. 
The ªrst strand of NLRB decisions does not refer speciªcally to 
CAAs but analyzes generally whether employers with government con-
tracts are covered by or are exempt from the NLRA. From 1979 to 1995, 
the NLRB used a two-prong test to determine whether it had jurisdiction 
over such an employer: the employer not only had to meet the NLRA’s 
deªnition of an employer—it could not be a public employer or “political 
subdivision”94—but also had to retain “sufªcient control over the em-
ployment conditions of its employees to bargain with a labor organiza-
tion as their representative.”95 Under this test, an employer that received 
government funding but that did not qualify as a public subdivision might 
still be able to escape NLRB jurisdiction if it could demonstrate that the 
stringent requirements of its government funding did not allow it enough 
ºexibility to bargain over working conditions.96 
In 1995, however, the NLRB reªned its test to determine jurisdic-
tion. In Management Training Corporation,97 the NLRB found that the 
second prong of the test, which it characterized as being about the “con-
trol of economic terms and conditions,”98 was “an over-simpliªcation of 
the bargaining process”99 and as such was “unworkable and unrealis-
tic.”100 The NLRB limited its analysis of whether it should assert jurisdic-
tion to the ªrst prong of the test: whether the employer in question meets 
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the NLRA’s deªnition of an employer.101 This expansive deªnition allows 
the NLRB to assert jurisdiction more frequently. 
The NLRA provides that any party may appeal a ªnal NLRB deci-
sion to a federal court of appeals for the region involved.102 Four of the 
ªve circuits that have heard a case on the new Management Training rule 
have adopted it,103 one actually adopting it in the context of approving 
NLRB jurisdiction over a Head Start program.104 While the state of the 
Management Training rule is in some legal ºux,105 the general trend in 
the federal courts of appeals seems to be towards approving NLRB juris-
diction based on whether the employer in question meets the NLRA’s 
deªnition of an employer. 
How to determine whether an employer is an exempt “political sub-
division” is not itself an easy task, however. A second strand of NLRB 
decisions has clariªed and limited the facts under which a CAA may 
qualify as an exempt “political subdivision.” In 1971, the Supreme Court 
gave some guidance regarding the types of entities that may constitute a 
“political subdivision” and thus be exempt from the NLRA. The Court 
noted that the NRLB had adopted a two-prong test, “entitled to great re-
spect,”106 classifying an entity as a political subdivision only if it was 
“‘created directly by the state, so as to constitute a department or admin-
istrative arm of the government,’” or if it was “‘administered by indi-
viduals who are responsible to public ofªcials or to the general elector-
ate.’”107 
The ªrst prong of the NLRB test is fairly straightforward in its ap-
plication to CAAs: if the state created the CAA to administer its pro-
grams directly, the CAA counts as an exempt political subdivision. The 
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NLRB continues to ªnd CAAs created by the state as exempt from the 
NLRA under this ªrst prong of the test.108 
It is on the second prong that the NLRB has recently changed its 
thinking. Until 1998, the NLRB had considered any CAA that was not 
exempt under the ªrst prong to be exempt under the second prong be-
cause of the statutorily mandated structure of the CAA board.109 CAAs 
are governed by a tripartite board: one-third of the board must be elected 
public ofªcials;110 at least one-third of the board must be representatives 
of the poor in the community served;111 and the balance must come from 
other community groups.112 Since the public ofªcials are democratically 
elected to their political positions, although not to the CAA board, and 
since the representatives of the poor must be “chosen [to be on the CAA 
board] in accordance with democratic selection procedures,”113 the NLRB 
used to reason that the CAA board consists of a majority of “individuals 
who are responsible to public ofªcials or to the general electorate,”114 
under the second prong of its test.115 Governed by such a board, the CAA 
would be exempt from the NLRA. 
In the 1998 decision Enrichment Services Program, Inc., however, 
the NLRB changed its reasoning by examining more closely the “democ-
ratic selection procedures” under which the representatives of the poor 
are chosen.116 The NLRB noted that the electorate for the slots reserved 
for representatives of the poor was not usually the same as the electorate 
for a general political election.117 Only if the electorate were the same 
would a majority of the individuals on the CAA board be responsible to 
the general electorate and thus exempt from the NLRA.118 In reaching 
this decision, the NLRB overruled the line of cases ªnding CAAs to be 
exempt political subdivisions where the two electorates were not the 
same.119 
This NLRB decision has yet to be tested in any federal court, and 
some lawyers for CAAs expect to see it challenged.120 When a federal 
court disagrees with the NLRB, it is the court’s opinion that is control-
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ling, at least in that federal circuit, and it is possible that different judi-
cially enforced standards may emerge in different areas of the country 
unless and until the Supreme Court decides the matter.121 Even in the ad-
ministrative context itself, it is worth noting that there has been turn-over 
in the ªve members of the NLRB since 1998, when the Enrichment Ser-
vices Program standard was announced, and that a new Board may de-
cide the matter differently.122 Still, although the ultimate state of this law 
is uncertain, the new NLRB analysis making it more difªcult for CAAs 
to gain exemption from the NLRA has provided CAA employees, includ-
ing Head Start teachers, with a greater probability that federal labor laws 
will protect them. 
Yet the nominal protection of federal labor laws goes only so far. Al-
though the labor movement perceives NLRB jurisdiction over CAAs as a 
success, continuing administrative maneuvering and litigation over these 
issues may work to the strategic advantage of employers, which can use 
legal challenges to delay tangible union accomplishments.123 In addition, 
jurisdiction is a legal description of the NLRB’s reach rather than a struc-
tural modiªcation of a CAA’s behavior, and CAAs have sometimes con-
tinued anti-union activities despite the requirements of the NLRA. 
Such anti-union activity does have prescribed legal boundaries, how-
ever, both from the terms of the NLRA and from the Head Start Act it-
self. CAAs that are covered by the NLRA must abide by its terms to re-
main within the law. Further, as of 1990, the Head Start Act explicitly 
directs that “[f]unds appropriated to carry out this subchapter shall not be 
used to assist, promote, or deter union organizing.”124 How, then, have 
Head Start programs and Community Action Agencies that operate them 
been able to carry out their anti-union campaigns? 
The answer may be found in two recent information memoranda is-
sued by the federal Head Start Bureau, the regulatory agency responsible 
for funding, monitoring, and communicating with individual Head Start 
programs.125 Disseminated in response to the rise in unionization efforts, 
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the memoranda have two goals. First, they refer agencies to the NLRB 
for information regarding which anti-union activities are legal and which 
are illegal under the terms of the NLRA.126 Second, they clarify the Head 
Start Act’s prohibition on using Head Start funds in response to a union 
campaign.127 They explain that, although no Head Start funds may be 
used in connection with a pro- or anti-union campaign, agencies may use 
other funds in this vein so long as they document their spending and their 
funding sources.128 Further, the memoranda indicate that Head Start funds 
may cover incidental costs, such as utilities used during an after-hours 
union organizing meeting, and may be used to consult lawyers about 
“rights and responsibilities” under the NLRA and other laws related to 
union organizing.129 Notwithstanding these limitations on the use of Head 
Start funds to deter union organizing, some Head Start employers have 
found a way to ªght nascent unions in their midst. They remain within 
the bounds of the Head Start Act by using non-Head Start funds for these 
activities, but they simultaneously violate the terms of the NLRA in the 
process by engaging in unfair labor practices. 
Accusations of these unfair labor practices constitute the second 
type of legal battle between Head Start employees and employers. Both 
employers and unions may bring an unfair labor practice (ULP) charge 
against the other party in front of the NLRB, although in practice, unions 
ªle these charges more frequently than do employers.130 In the Head Start 
context, employers have been found in violation of the labor laws for 
retaliating against employees who were engaged in legal unionizing ac-
tivities. Within the past ªve years, directors of Head Start programs have 
violated labor laws in numerous ways: by discharging or threatening to 
discharge teachers who supported the union;131 by harassing union mem-
bers through false accusations of theft or the imposition of new restric-
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tions on their use of program facilities;132 by scheduling mandatory 
teachers’ meetings at the same time as previously scheduled union meet-
ings;133 by refusing to negotiate with the union at all.134 The list goes on. 
Even if the NLRB ªnds merit in the union’s claim, however, the vic-
tory is not unmitigated. Relationships in the CAA often are damaged by 
these charges and administrative hearings, and the parties may ªnd it 
difªcult to move on. For example, one of the most recent Head Start ULP 
cases to come before the NLRB was the third such case out of the same 
CAA over a period of ªve years. The Head Start directors were found to 
have engaged in many of the unfair labor practices described above and a 
wide variety of others.135 The administrative law judge deciding this most 
recent case commented sadly on the “substantial history of [the parties’] 
contentious relationship. That history records in many instances [the 
CAA’s] open hostility at its highest management level both to the Union 
and employees who supported its organizing efforts.”136 The judge further 
stated, “It is my fervent hope, that with the conclusion of this case, this 
marks the end of [this] repetitious and somewhat wasteful litigation 
. . . .”137 Yet he noted that “matters between the parties have not com-
pletely settled,” even though the collective bargaining agreement had 
been signed two years earlier.138 Although the judge bid the parties to fol-
low the new procedures put in place by the contract as the parties “at-
tempt to fulªll, as they are committed to, the difªcult but nonetheless 
worthy goal of providing educational and other opportunities to disad-
vantaged Americans,”139 his decision—spanning more than one hundred 
pages—gives no indication of how the legal resolution of these issues 
will translate into a change in the actual dynamics of the parties’ rela-
tionship. 
Further, resolution of a ULP in one party’s favor is not necessarily 
an unqualiªed victory or loss for either party, since the remedy may be 
unsatisfactory to the victor. For example, consider the case of Jan Rad-
der, a Head Start teacher ªred from Parents in Community Action, Inc., a 
CAA in Minneapolis, for his involvement in organizing a union.140 When 
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Radder was ªred, the union ªled initial charges of unfair labor practices 
against the CAA.141 After examining the facts, the NLRB petitioned the 
district court in the District of Minnesota for a preliminary injunction 
against the CAA’s anti-union activity,142 as permitted by the terms of the 
NLRA.143 Yet the district court declined to issue an injunction, and a year 
later the Eighth Circuit afªrmed its decision.144 
The Eighth Circuit explained that a court may issue a preliminary in-
junction only after the NLRB has demonstrated that “irreparable harm” 
will come to the collective bargaining process if the parties must wait for 
a remedy before the NLRB has ªnished adjudicating the matter.145 While 
the district court agreed that the teacher had likely been ªred for his un-
ion activities, it declined to order him to be reinstated, since revisions to 
the federal Head Start requirements for teacher qualiªcations meant that 
Radder was no longer qualiªed to hold his position.146 The Eighth Circuit 
held that the district court was correct in not ordering his reinstatement 
because, in balancing the public interest with the likelihood of irrepara-
ble injury to Radder, the district court reasonably determined that the 
Head Start program would suffer if Radder were reinstated.147 Addition-
ally, the Eighth Circuit noted that injury to the individual was not the 
appropriate standard for determining whether an injunction is appropri-
ate, given the existence of a monetary remedy; the key issue is ongoing 
irreparable injury to the union organizing drive.148 An employer’s actions 
that may chill union organizing do not establish such irreparable harm, 
the court decided, unless collective bargaining has been ongoing or a 
scheduled union election has been disrupted, especially if unionization 
efforts have not garnered widespread support from employees.149 The 
court did not consider the negative effect that anti-union activities might 
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have had on the union drive itself, however, nor could it consider any 
additional negative impact that this court decision might have. 
As this case was wending its way through the federal courts, an ad-
ministrative law judge of the NLRB determined that the CAA had com-
mitted almost a dozen unfair labor practices in its attempts to keep its 
employees from forming a union.150 The NLRB ordered among other 
remedies that Radder be reinstated,151 but the Eighth Circuit’s recognition 
that Radder was no longer qualiªed under the new Head Start require-
ments made that reinstatement unlikely. While the union won a victory in 
the NLRB forum, in that the unfair labor practice charge was decided in 
its favor, the actual remedy was hardly what the union members had 
hoped for. The ªred union activist was not reinstated, and the CAA was 
able to continue its anti-union activity with no preliminary injunction to 
stop it, all seemingly with the imprimatur of the federal court system. On 
the other hand, despite its victory in the federal courts, the CAA lost in 
the NLRB and received bad press for its anti-union activities.152 In the 
end, the legal maneuvering in the Head Start unionization struggle can 
achieve only limited success. 
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II. Strategies for Reform 
These arenas—the practical, the rhetorical, and the legal—provide 
the stages on which the main conºicts between labor and management in 
Head Start programs and Community Action Agencies are acted out. But 
what happens next? How can the parties move beyond such conºicts the 
better to accomplish their shared mission? This Part proposes three types 
of solutions: legislative changes to the Head Start Act, regulatory altera-
tions from the Head Start Bureau, and external relationship-building and 
problem-solving solutions from the National Head Start Association. 
A. The Head Start Act: Legislative Solutions 
The Head Start Act is up for reauthorization this year.153 Modiªca-
tions to the Head Start Act in four areas would help alleviate conºicts 
related to unionization. 
First, the reauthorized Act should include a stronger prohibition 
against using Head Start funds to assist, promote, or deter union organiz-
ing. A complete ban on the provision of Head Start funds to organiza-
tions that are engaged in these activities would likely be deemed an un-
constitutional restriction on free speech.154 Furthermore, Congress may 
be reluctant to bind agencies’ hands too tightly. Given the recent debates 
about job protection and civil service unions in the proposed Department 
of Homeland Security,155 Congress might prefer to let agencies decide for 
themselves whether to deter unions using non-federal funds. 
Given these concerns, a more reasonable and politically feasible 
change would be the addition of the following sentence to the Head Start 
Act: “Receipt of Head Start funds is contingent on an organization’s 
obeying the relevant state and federal labor laws.” Why should Congress 
continue to provide ªnancial support under one act to an organization 
that ignores the requirements of another? Yet CAAs have ºouted labor 
laws, and have been cited by the NLRB for unfair labor practices, with 
no apparent effect on their Head Start budgets.156 The Head Start regula-
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tions already contain a proscription against violating federal laws for en-
tities receiving federal money.157 Making this requirement statutory and 
tying it explicitly to the Head Start unionization context would demon-
strate the importance of obeying labor laws. It also would clarify the 
Head Start Bureau’s authority to initiate proceedings against Head Start 
agencies that engage in unfair labor practices. Unless Congress more 
strongly afªrms its support for the NLRA and state labor laws, agencies 
will be able to break labor laws with no ªnancial repercussions for their 
Head Start programs. 
A second change to the Head Start Act that might alleviate or reduce 
union conºicts would be the required development of federal regulations 
on labor-management relations. Aside from the stipulation that no Head 
Start funds be used in connection with union organizing, the Act contains 
no reference to labor-management relations, even though such relations 
are increasingly important as unionization efforts occur with greater fre-
quency. The Act already mandates the Secretary of the Department of 
Health and Human Services to establish “policies and procedures” and 
“appropriate administrative measures” to ensure that various program 
goals are met, such as the provision of services to a certain percentage of 
children with disabilities, or the equitable distribution of resources be-
tween urban and rural areas.158 Similarly, the Act should require the Head 
Start Bureau to develop its own policies and procedures on labor rela-
tions. Such a requirement would demonstrate a programmatic commit-
ment to ensuring that labor relations run smoothly. 
In the same vein, the reauthorized Act could require the development 
of a set of performance standards for management. The Act presently 
contains a detailed list of standards that the Secretary of Health and Hu-
man Services must create, including those for educational, administra-
tive, and ªnancial performance, and for facility conditions and loca-
tions.159 Another set of detailed requirements focuses on teacher and staff 
qualiªcations.160 Just as teachers must have certain educational back-
grounds and follow speciªed classroom procedures, so managers could 
be obligated to take classes in labor-management relations, human re-
sources, and leadership, and to reach designated performance levels in 
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their interactions with employees. Such a provision would send a clear 
message that Head Start programs can work smoothly only if managers 
as well as teachers are held accountable. Training in management skills 
could also lead to improved labor relations. Requiring agencies to moni-
tor labor relations and to develop performance standards for management 
would signal the federal government’s commitment to improving labor 
relations in Head Start agencies. 
Third, the reauthorized Act should revisit the issue of salary and 
beneªt levels so that the urge to increase employee compensation is not 
undercut by a race to the bottom. The current version of the Head Start 
Act does emphasize the importance of adequate salary and beneªt levels. 
For example, the Act indicates that such levels at their base should be 
“adequate to attract and retain qualiªed staff,”161 and it suggests that addi-
tional “[q]uality improvement funds” should be set aside “to improve the 
compensation (including beneªts) of classroom teachers and other staff 
of Head Start agencies and thereby enhance recruitment and retention of 
qualiªed staff.”162 Yet the Act also includes language that limits agencies’ 
ºexibility in designing generous compensation packages: 
The Secretary shall take such action as may be necessary to as-
sure that persons employed in carrying out programs ªnanced 
under this subchapter shall not receive compensation at a rate 
which is (1) in excess of the average rate of compensation paid 
in the area where the program is carried out to a substantial 
number of persons providing substantially comparable services, 
or in excess of the average rate of compensation paid to a sub-
stantial number of the persons providing substantially compara-
ble services in the area of the person’s immediately preceding 
employment, whichever is higher; or (2) less than the minimum 
wage . . . .163 
The ºoor for Head Start salaries is simple—staff must make at least 
the minimum wage.164 This is not much of a requirement, however, given 
the general applicability of the minimum wage.165 The discussion of the 
ceiling for Head Start salaries is more complicated—Head Start staff 
cannot be paid more than the average rate for other workers providing 
“substantially comparable services” in the same geographic area. How-
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ever these “substantially comparable services” are deªned, it is clear that 
the services provided by Head Start employees are not provided by well-
paid workers in other occupations. 
Instead of stipulating that Head Start staff earn no more than the go-
ing rate, the Act could mandate that Head Start staff earn at least as much 
as other workers providing “substantially comparable services.” This 
change would convert the current ceiling into a new ºoor, and would pre-
clude government-funded programs from undercutting what is already a 
low-wage labor market. Alternatively, the Act could require Head Start 
salaries and beneªts to be commensurate with the compensation pack-
ages provided to teachers in local school districts. This approach would 
address the aforementioned concern about disparities in compensation 
and the consequent brain-drain of Head Start teachers to the public 
school system.166 In any event, the current limit on Head Start salaries 
prevents agencies from experimenting with the full range of salary and 
beneªt packages and places an unreasonable ceiling on compensation, 
thereby undermining the statutory mandate to attract and retain qualiªed 
candidates. 
Finally, the Act should be altered to provide incentives for research 
on labor-management relations in Head Start programs. Not enough aca-
demic research on Head Start employees and workforce management 
exists, since the wealth of Head Start research focuses (understandably 
and reasonably) on child and family development outcomes.167 Because 
the Head Start union campaigns repeatedly ªght with management over 
the same concerns, however, thorough and systematic attention must be 
paid to these issues at a national level. The Head Start Act already au-
thorizes funding for several speciªed research topics;168 designating labor 
and employment issues in Head Start programs as a new priority area for 
research would be a step in the right direction. In addition, the Act should 
identify teachers and union ofªcials as important groups to consult in the 
establishment of research agendas, since these groups currently are ex-
cluded from the list of important players.169 
In addition to empirical research on wages and pensions, there is a 
particular need for research on the effects of unionizing on the CAA 
workplace and on Head Start program success. Qualitative research, in-
cluding descriptions of best practices in employee-management relations, 
also would be useful. Not all CAAs with Head Start programs have met 
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unionization drives with rancor, and it would be instructive to understand 
what other models exist. A body of work devoted to cataloguing and ana-
lyzing the stories from CAAs and Head Start programs that have wit-
nessed unionization would inform the struggles to come and, with any 
luck, would help the parties move from conºict to common ground. 
B. The Head Start Bureau: Regulatory Changes 
Although the Head Start Bureau has responded to the rise in Head 
Start unionization efforts by issuing the aforementioned information 
memoranda,170 its independent ability to address labor-management ten-
sions is limited, for the Bureau must follow the dictates of Congress. If 
Congress adopts the four recommendations discussed above, the Head 
Start Bureau will be authorized to create and implement an extensive se-
ries of regulations designed to promote improved labor-management rela-
tions. Even in the absence of such changes, however, the Bureau’s hands 
are not completely tied. Although the Head Start Act has very detailed 
requirements, the Bureau retains some discretion to develop regulations 
through the usual administrative process of rule-making and the explicit 
terms of the Head Start Act.171 Thus, the Bureau might undertake a num-
ber of helpful initiatives, such as revising current regulations to favor 
agencies with clear labor relations plans in the grantee selection process, 
or expanding the provision of training and technical assistance on labor 
and employment issues to funding recipients, within already statutorily 
approved guidelines. 
For example, the regulation on grantee selection currently provides 
that candidates will be chosen based on “the extent to which the appli-
cants demonstrate in their application the most effective Head Start pro-
gram.”172 The applicable criteria include “the qualiªcations and experi-
ence of the applicant and the applicant’s staff in planning, organizing and 
providing comprehensive child development services at the community 
level, including the administrative and ªscal capability of the applicant to 
administer all Head Start programs carried out in the designated service 
area.”173 It would not be too much of a stretch to consider management’s 
labor relations skills and human resources training plans as evidence of 
“administrative capability.” Explicit reference to these criteria would put 
applicants on notice that such issues are important and would require 
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them to establish relevant procedures and policies before they receive any 
funding. 
After being chosen as Head Start grant recipients, agencies are re-
quired to develop written personnel policies that contain, among other 
items, “a description of employee-management relations procedures, in-
cluding those for managing employee grievances and adverse actions.”174 
The regulations could go one step further and require that training on 
these written policies be provided to managers and employees. 
Finally, the regulations already mandate that directors of Head Start 
programs “have demonstrated skills and abilities in a management capac-
ity relevant to human services program management.”175 Since the Act’s 
requirements with regard to the skills and knowledge that teachers must 
possess are much more detailed, it would be reasonable for the regula-
tions to further elaborate management’s qualiªcations as well, perhaps by 
stipulating that directors must be trained in labor and employment law 
and experienced in fostering employee leadership. 
Beyond getting new regulations on the books, the Head Start Bureau 
should undertake a second major initiative even in the absence of a new 
legislative mandate—expanding its provision of training and technical 
assistance to Head Start directors. For instance, many directors need help 
in interpreting and complying with the NLRA. The information memo-
randa on union organizing were an important ªrst step in a national re-
sponse to this new issue facing Head Start programs, but more needs to 
be done. Instead of simply listing a few actions that violate the NLRA 
and sending people to the NLRB’s Web site for further information,176 the 
Bureau could create Head Start-speciªc training material on the NLRA, 
perhaps using case studies from the various conºicts described in Part I 
above. 
The Head Start Bureau also could provide additional training on 
sound management practices. Its regulations manual cites to written 
works on program governance, management systems and procedures, and 
human resources management, but most of these references are at least a 
decade old and make almost no mention of labor-management rela-
tions.177 The Bureau should create and disseminate up-to-date materials 
on such practices. It is worth noting that the federal Child Care Bureau, 
which is adjacent to the Head Start Bureau in Washington, D.C., has been 
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funding research projects on the workforce in child care programs for 
several years, although nothing in its authorizing statute requires it to do 
so.178 Even if the reauthorized Head Start statute contains no reference to 
research on labor relations, the Head Start Bureau could still begin a re-
search initiative on workforce issues modeled after that of the Child Care 
Bureau, and could provide additional training to grantees based on the 
research ªndings. 
Finally, the Head Start Bureau could inform its grantees about alter-
native dispute resolution mechanisms in labor conºicts. The second in-
formation memorandum on union organizing includes an explicit dis-
claimer for the ACF, explaining that this agency “plays an important but 
limited role” in the area of labor disputes—ensuring that no Head Start 
money is spent to deter or promote labor unions in violation of the stat-
ute.179 The memorandum emphasizes that the NLRB, not ACF or the 
Head Start Bureau, is responsible for enforcing compliance with the 
NLRA, and that “it is not appropriate for ACF to become involved in ac-
tivities such as arbitrating disputes between unions and Head Start grant-
ees.”180 
The appearance of this explanation of ACF’s role in the second 
memorandum suggests that Head Start agencies turned to ACF and the 
Head Start Bureau for guidance and assistance, and that such assistance 
was deemed inappropriate. Yet because the Head Start Bureau ultimately 
is responsible for ensuring that Head Start programs run smoothly and 
effectively, this agency must play a role in preempting and ameliorating 
labor conºicts. The Bureau currently contracts with outside agencies to 
provide resources on a variety of issues that affect Head Start pro-
grams,181 from transportation182 to facilities.183 It should do the same with 
labor and employment issues. If it is not the Bureau’s job to mediate or 
arbitrate in labor problems, it can at least provide resources to which 
programs can turn. 
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C. The National Head Start Association: 
Labor and Employment Initiative 
Legislative and regulatory changes would go a long way towards 
improving labor relations in Head Start programs, but they will not pro-
vide a complete solution. At the most basic level, the best way to move 
beyond the current dynamic of conºict is to change the relationships be-
tween and among the different parties. The National Head Start Associa-
tion (NHSA) should create a new labor and employment initiative to 
bring the parties together for preemptive problem-solving before labor 
strife emerges, and for mediation and conciliation services in moments of 
dispute. 
The NHSA is a private nonproªt membership organization whose 
mission is to serve the interests of the entire national Head Start commu-
nity: children, parents, staff, and directors.184 The NHSA has paid rela-
tively little attention to the explosion of union organizing in Head Start 
programs, however. For instance, its Web site provides resources and in-
formation for every sector of the Head Start community, but it contains 
just one reference to unionizing efforts.185 Given the importance the 
NHSA attaches to helping employees obtain raises and maintain job se-
curity,186 this organization should expand its focus on labor and employ-
ment issues to speak to all parties in the unionization debates. 
In each arena of conºict discussed in Part I of this Note, the parties 
raise important issues while creating dynamics that are not conducive to 
long-term relationships. Each point of controversy is presented as a zero-
sum game where there can be only one winner. Thus, more work must be 
done at the national and the local level to identify the common interests 
that underlie the parties’ seemingly contrary positions. Given the shared 
commitment to lifting families out of poverty and into self-sufªciency, 
points of mutual beneªt are likely to exist. The proposed NHSA Labor 
and Employment Initiative could provide a framework through which the 
parties can discover areas of agreement and develop healthy working re-
lationships before any labor strife emerges. 
The existence of some labor conºicts will be inevitable, however, 
and members of the Head Start community need resources to help them 
work through their problems. The NHSA should partner with the Federal 
Mediation and Conciliation Service, or with a private nonproªt alterna-
tive dispute resolution organization, to provide both training and counsel-
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ing to agencies experiencing conºict. Because so much of what is at 
stake in labor discussions in the Head Start context refers to national 
standards and requirements, a national organization that is familiar with 
Head Start issues must take the lead in addressing them. Moreover, since 
so many local disputes repeat themselves around the country, individuals 
crafting solutions at the local level would beneªt from knowledge of the 
rich array of experiences nationwide. The NHSA is well positioned to 
play this important role. 
Conclusion 
Not all union drives in Community Action Agencies that operate 
Head Start programs lead to rancor and bitterness, of course, but those 
that do can be extremely divisive and hurtful to everyone involved. This 
Note suggests that more attention must be paid at a national level to help 
resolve these local manifestations of a national problem. I propose sev-
eral strategies that might address some root causes of the conºict, but my 
primary hope is that a greater focus on labor and employment issues in 
these programs will generate even more solutions, not only for the strug-
gle over unionization, but also for the nascent struggle over the living 
wage. Since the missions of CAA-operated Head Start programs and the 
labor movement overlap, labor and management should be able to work 
together more effectively. Recall the union’s slogan cited at the beginning 
of this Note: “Head Start works because we do.”187 If the word “we” in 
this slogan can be expanded to encompass both directors and teachers, 
and if directors and teachers can learn to work together on labor and em-
ployment issues more amicably and productively, then Head Start will 
work even more successfully for everyone. 
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